The Brexit Blame Game

With the date of the United Kingdom exiting the European Union fast approaching and the ratification of the EU-UK withdrawal agreement still pending, an orderly Brexit is increasingly unlikely. The risk of a fiasco, a ‘no deal’ Brexit – the one outcome that only a small minority of British politicians advocates – is increasing. What explains this looming Brexit fiasco? To explain the drivers behind the Brexit fiasco, we develop a theory on blame games that applies to wedge issues in international negotiations. In the House of Commons, Brexit constitutes a wedge issue where conflict lines do not coincide with party lines but cut across them. Parliamentary debates thus come as intra-partisan blame games. These differ fundamentally from inter-partisan blame games, normally accompanying the negotiation of international agreements, as members of parliament (MPs) attribute blame not only across party lines but also within their own parties. The government has to take a stance in favor of the negotiated agreement and, therefore, is facing blame not only from opposition MPs, but also from within its own ranks. This intra-partisan blame game then begets an escalatory dynamic increasing the probability of non-ratification. Instead of normal politics of moderation linked to inter-partisan blame games, the government has a strong incentive to pursue a politics of intransigence to obtain ratification. Since wedge issues tend to mobilize intra-party opposition and eschew intra-party compromise, the government tends to demonstrate its resolve to stick to the negotiated agreement to force dissenting MPs to support the agreement. By triggering a domestic chicken game between supporters and opponents, this risk a political fiasco! We develop our theory in two steps. We first differentiate between inter-partisan and intra-partisan blame games in the context of international agreements. We then posit that these drive different kinds of politics of ratification, i.e. politics of moderation; and politics of intransigence. To empirically probe these expectations, we first conduct a content analysis of blame statements in parliamentary debates in the House of Commons. Subsequently, a process tracing analysis is conducted to demonstrate the escalatory dynamics of the politics of intransigence in the Brexit negotiations. Our theoretical argument does not only contribute to a better understanding of the looming Brexit fiasco, but also contributes to the literature on blame avoidance and politicization in three ways: Firstly, while the blame avoidance literature assumes that all blame games follow a similar logic, we show that debates on wedge issues come with a specific, intra-partisan blame game. Secondly, while this literature remained silent regarding the political consequences of blame games, we argue that intra-partisan blame games specifically tend to be associated with politics of intransigence, which increases the likelihood of a policy fiasco. Thirdly, while issue avoidance and de-politicization is assumed to be the preferred strategy of parties faced with a wedge issue, we argue that this strategy is not available for governments seeking ratification of international agreement. This, consequently, gives rise to stark politicization driven by all parties.