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The Role of Electoral Mandates in Shaping Government Responsiveness

Comparative Politics
Contentious Politics
Interest Groups
Political Parties
Public Policy
Representation
Public Opinion
Influence
Laura Morales
Sciences Po Paris
Laura Morales
Sciences Po Paris

Abstract

To what extent are democratic governments responsive to citizens’ demands and preferences between elections? Are governments more likely to be responsive to the expression of public opinion through surveys or to collective and publicly voiced opinion – generally in the form of protests? When does one ore the other type of expression prevail as a mechanism to foster governmental responsiveness? What happens when both forms of expression of the public mood are in clear contradiction? This paper is a chapter draft in a book that is the core output of a long-term research effort that aims at answering these research questions (the ResponsiveGov project). It will contribute in an innovative way to the study of democratic politics by paying close and careful attention to the dynamics of governmental responsiveness (or lack thereof) to the views and preferences that the multiple sectors of the public express through different modes of emitting signals and exerting pressure: through public opinion surveys and through collective action (protest, petitions, advocacy, etc.). The study focuses on how governments react when one or multiple sectors of the public clearly express preferences and demands that are at odds with those of the government. The core questions of the study look at when and under what conditions the various reactions from governments are more likely. Specifically, this chapter systematically analyses whether governments are more likely to respond to public pressure and opposition when they cannot easily or legitimately claim to have a strong electoral mandate to stick to their preferred policy course. It considers both the role of electoral pledges and the magnitude of the electoral support obtained, as well as the role played by critical or focusing events.