Existing approaches to understanding and explaining election fraud tend to focus exclusively on domestic-level explanations, such as the extent of the electoral threat posed by the opposition, the nature of the electoral system or the patterns of societal inequalities. Few studies examine the international determinants of election fraud, and to the extent that they are addressed, it is only with reference to those international influences that might constrain incumbents in their use of fraud. However, in weighing the costs and benefits of fraud, incumbent elites frequently receive signals from that the international costs associated with fraud (e.g. loss of international legitimacy, sanctions) may be mitigated by the protective policies of international allies and the tendency for lax implementation of democratic enforcement measures on the part of pro-democratic international actors.
In particular, the paper argues that the international arena can provide three important signals to incumbent elites that not only might the international costs of pursuing fraud be mitigated, but that the authoritarian regime in question may find robust support from certain quarters of the international community. The first signal comes from that fact that the enforcement of democratic norms by states and international organisations is frequently inconsistent and partial. The second signal concerns the fact that some election monitoring groups have a clear track record of approving flawed elections. Finally, it is also the case that some international actors can provide clear signals that they will defend fraudulent regimes even when their actions are exposed, for example by providing rhetorical support in international forums, and blocking international efforts at imposing punitive sanctions. The paper explores these dynamics with particular reference to successive elections in the case of Zimbabwe from 2000-2008, where the Mugabe regimes found considerable support from some quarters despite its record of blatant electoral fraud.
