Loyal Agent or Shirking Partner: Understanding the Policy Goals of National Ministers in the Council of the European Union

Research on representation within the European Union (EU) often assumes that partisan policy preferences are mediated primarily through the European Parliament (EP), while the European Council (EUCO) and Council of the European Union (Council) represent national interests. This assumption obfuscates the potential for divergent policy preferences within Council delegations, the majority of which are coalitions comprised of ideologically diverse parties. Such divergent preferences within national governments provide an incentive for coalition partners to pursue policy outcomes at the EU level that diverge from those of their coalition. This research assesses the existence of such policy shirking by members of the Council utilizing the DEU III dataset, party manifestos, and a new dataset on the partisan characteristics of individual Council members. This analysis provides insights into the factors that affect variations between perceptions of national positions as measured by the DEU III and coalition member preferences as reflected in party manifestos.