This paper develops a spatial, game-theoretical model of European Union (EU) policy making that includes the rotating Council Presidency as one of the main actors. Previous formal models have typically ignored the Council Presidency’s role, even though it is instrumental in shepherding the Commission’s proposals through the legislative process. We study whether the Commission takes the Presidency’s preferences into account when formulating proposals, and whether the Presidency’s role limits or expands the Commission’s powers. Contrary to previous findings that claim that the Commission has lost power as a result of the introduction and extension of the codecision procedure, our model shows that the Commission can maintain its level of influence by strategically using the rotating Presidency. We find empirical support for our theory in a study of more than two decades of EU policy making. We conclude that the Commission introduces more proposals closer to its ideal preferences in policy areas (1) that are important to the Presidency, and (2) where the preferences of the Commission and Council Presidency are closely aligned.
