Norm Diffusion and Prevention of Extremism in the European Union

European counterterrorism was thoroughly shaken by the 9/11 attacks, and fundamentally changed by the events of 11-M in Madrid. Much valuable research has looked at their effects on European policy and the rise in primacy of the EU as a security actor (Argomaniz, 2009; Boer, 2015; Bossong, 2014). Different explanations compete to explain how and why Member States (MSs) agreed to pool such core sovereignty functions at the EU level. Some theories give the main role in policy genesis to the Commission, as initiator of a path-dependent process after the 9/11 attacks (Bossong, 2007). Others give more weight to intergovernmental political manoeuvring within the Council (Den Boer, 2003); some theories point to the systemic dynamics of EU institutions as they vie, in concert, for EU self-preservation and higher relevance (Kaunert & Léonard, 2019). Finally, some authors link the rise of the EU as a security actor with larger securitisation of terrorism dynamics within the Western world (Jackson, 2007). Within such a complex and long-term process, one particular area has received insufficient attention: terrorism prevention, specifically, resilience building. Security networks disseminate privileged narratives about security preferences, potential threats and the corresponding policy options (Hillebrand, 2012). Epistemic and operational security networks have existed in the EU pre-9/11 and have continued up to our days, in the form of bureaucrats, special committees and working groups (Boer, Hillebrand, & Nölke, 2008). Identifying actors and concrete processes of knowledge transmission can provide valuable insights on the intra/inter-institutional and actor dynamics shaping EU counterterrorism policy. One of the most relevant epistemic communities nowadays is the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) and a multitude of associated projects funded by the European Commission under the Horizon2020 umbrella. These projects, together with RAN, have the main goal of producing new knowledge and bets practices on violent extremism, de-radicalisation and prevention processes, as well as training a new cohort of practitioners, policy makers and academics in the aforementioned new knowledge. My paper thus explores two areas; firstly, the logic and procedure of emergence and establishment of the notion of resilience within EU epistemic networks. This includes institutional moves and documents, as well as new funding opportunities and the creation of new EU structures, as well as the justification for the need for those. And second, how these communities function as “disseminators” of security knowledge and practice preferences, in their journey from informal discussions, best practice papers and interaction with other security agencies, national and EU alike. Methodologically speaking, this paper is based on two waves of fieldwork in the form of semi-structured interviews, firstly with EU actors and secondly with practitioners and academics involved in radicalisation knowledge creation and dissemination.