Italy in the EU: When Domestic Constraints Weigh You Down

Research on European Union negotiations has traditionally viewed Italy as something of a puzzle. While being one of the founding Members of the European Community and the fourth largest economy in the EU, Italy does not stand out as a particularly proactive or influential Member State when it comes to day-to-day EU decision-making. Yet, the literature on EU negotiations has so far failed to provide a comprehensive explanation for Italy’s puzzling performance. Existing research, especially the body of literature spawned by Robert Putnam’s two-level game, has considered certain types of domestic factors, but critically ignored others. Namely, the focus has rested on institutional constraints – primarily referenda requirements or parliamentary mandate – and on the presence of specific actors such as strong interest groups or a eurosceptic public opinion. However, only few academics from the European integration literature have investigated the role of structural, systemic and individual factors, such as level of ministerial coordination, rate of government turnover and individual negotiators’ characteristics. This study aims to examine the impact of these variables on negotiation outcomes by addressing the following: How and under what conditions do domestic constraints influence Member States negotiation success at the EU? In order to answer the question, the paper examines Italy’s negotiation of recent and highly salient fiscal and migration policies between 2008 and 2016. For each policy area, a case of negotiation success and a case of negotiation failure is included (whereby a negotiation is considered successful if the government managed to have its core interests at least partly incorporated into EU policy). The analysis is based on several semi-structured elite interviews with high ranking Italian politicians and EU-level civil servants, on official documents and minutes of the Council of the EU, secondary literature and media reports. The empirical findings reveal that, indeed, Italy’s systemic political instability, the consequent turnover of negotiators with varying degrees of expertise, and the structural weaknesses in the domestic coordination mechanism all fail to guarantee a consistently good performance in EU decision-making. Yet, the key finding – and most valuable contribution – of the study concerns the interaction between domestic factors and EU-level variables in shaping the outcome of EU negotiations. Even when the domestic context allows for considerable negotiation capacity, lack of support at the EU level might nevertheless significantly limit a Member State’s chances of success. Vice versa, when a Member State has strong support at the EU level, it is likely that it will see its interests incorporated in EU policy, even when it enjoys limited negotiation capacity. In short, the paper seeks to address a case study for which the existing literature has not yet provided a satisfactory explanation. In doing so, the study introduces a new theoretical framework integrating two bodies of research not commonly put into dialogue: negotiation theory and the European integration literature. Finally, the paper offers a timely examination of negotiations surrounding highly salient policies, thus offering new and insightful material to scholars of EU decision-making.