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Formal and Informal Empowerment of the European Commission and the European Central Bank During the Euro Crisis

European Union
Euro
Eurozone
Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt
Technische Universität München – TUM School of Governance
Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt
Technische Universität München – TUM School of Governance
Tony Müller
Technische Universität München – TUM School of Governance
Tony Müller
Technische Universität München – TUM School of Governance
Elena Rios Camacho
Technische Universität München – TUM School of Governance

Abstract

There is a broad disagreement among EU scholars whether the European Commission (henceforth, the Commission) has been (dis)empowered during the euro crisis. Whilst some studies consider that the European Central Bank (ECB) has been empowered vis-à-vis of the Commission (Da Conceição-Heldt, 2016; Puetter, 2012; Schimmelfennig, 2015), others argue that the Commission has been strengthened (Bauer and Adams 2013). Against this background, this paper examines shifts in the interinstitutional balance of power between the Commission and the ECB. To this end, we will map the de jure and de facto empowerment of the ECB during the euro crisis. We will look at the following three components of power: tasks delegated to the Commission in comparison with those delegated to the ECB; the scope and intrusiveness of issue areas in which both institutions exercise power; and the staff and financial capabilities that underpin the work of both institutions. In a second step, we introduce a distinction between formal and informal supranational empowerment. Formal empowerment refers to explicit and formal changes to European treaties, rules of procedure and other legal documents defining the tasks to be performed by European institutions. By contrast, informal empowerment of supranational institutions takes place when new tasks are added into the mandate of a supranational institution, when the issue areas in which European institutions tasks are performed are extended, and when staff and capabilities increase without changing the treaties. To measure empowerment of supranational institutions, we will focus on four cases: the set-up of the European Stability Mechanism, the establishment of the Troika, the Fiscal Compact, and the creation of Banking Union. Data will mostly consist of Commission’s legislative proposals, European Council conclusions, ECB’s speeches, statements and policy documents, and semi-structured interviews with EU officials.