Interinstitutional Power Dynamics in the European Decision-Making Process and its Impact on Policy Output: the Case Arms Export Control and Transparency Legislation

Despite the wording of Article 346 of the TFEU, exempting arms export control matters from a common regulatory regime, since the Nineties a Europeanisation process has started, following different decision-making modes. The first was the traditional intergovernmental approach (using both unanimity and qualified majority), within the Council, whose main outcome was the Common Position 2008/944/CFSP on European Arms Exports (8 December 2008). The second was a joint decision-making mode which led to the approval of the Defence package and in particular of the EU Directive 2009/43/EC on defense intra-community transfers. The third is a supranational mode which has characterised the pro-active role of EU Commission and the European Court of Justice which is not examined in this paper). The Commission has displayed all its range of powers producing communications, infringement procedures, preparatory actions and creation of a group of experts, whose main outcomes are the creation of ESRP (European Security Research Programme) and later of the EDF (European Defense Fund). The aim of this paper is to analyse strengthens and weaknesses of each of these outcomes, in terms of effectiveness, but also of legitimacy, transparency, and balance between ethical and economic variables, both in a comparative and diachronic perspective before and after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. In order to do that I use a case study methodology and a domestic perspective. I assess the domestic change in three case studies (Italy, France, and Hungary), as a consequence of these outcomes. The direction and intensity of domestic change are assessed along four dimensions (balance between executive and legislature, the balance between accountability and opacity; between ethical and human rights principles vs market approach; positive integration vs negative integration) and measured on a scale from 0 to 5. My theoretical framework is represented by Scharpf theory on the joint decision trap and its exit strategies, as integrated by Suzanne Schmidt and interpreted by Webber (Scharpf 2006, Schmidt 2011, Webber 2019). According to Scharpf, the intergovernmental and joint decision modes are blocked by the so-called Joint decision trap, thus leading to inactivity sub-optimal solutions. On the other hand, the supranational hierarchical mode may unblock the decision trap and be more effective, but at the same time, present political consequences and risks in terms of legitimacy “Overall the three modes seem likely to produce outcome that tends to work more in the direction of disintegration than closer integration" (Webber 2019:27). The aim of this research is twofold: theoretical and political. Firstly, with my empirical findings, I would like to test Scharpf theory in the unconventional armament field and eventually integrate and correct it. Secondly, I would like to offer empirical evidence/to assess the consistency of the outcomes from different institutions and their different trajectories, to identify the direction which prevails and to offers instruments to facilitate actions for increasing the overall coherence of the EU initiatives in the arms export.