Can PeSCo Be More Than a Prolix Bureaucratic Talk?

The EU’s Council of Ministers decided to establish PESCO on 8 December 2017, with the involvement of 25 member states – all but the UK (for obvious reasons), Denmark (which has a standing opt-out from the CSDP) and Malta. The first draft of the PeSCo proved overtime to produce great enthusiasm concerning the project to deepen European defense integration and develop initiatives aimed at achieving a higher level of EU ambition as well as strategic autonomy. However, time has also shown that the EU countries have different expectancy regarding PeSCo. The first group of states endorses the idea of PeSCo being more than a project, while others underlined that PeSCo should not undermine NATO. Therefore, we need to ask: what makes PeSCo different from previous initiatives? The first thing coming from the scholars that the PeSCo is different because it is an end product of the EU Council decision. Consequently, since the Council decisions are legally binding, PeSCo, unlike other initiatives, will not perish. However, we believe that the bureaucratic uniqueness of PeSCo can not produce a more profound institutionalization between its member states. Therefore, the proposed paper will examine the credibility of the PeSCo by addressing the two most essential hallmarks of military alliances: 1) can PesCo increase the ability of its members to fight together, and 2) what will be the peacetime cost on the allies.