Democracy Without Democrats? The Impact of Authoritarian Value Orientations on Democratic Consent in Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic

Following the swift initial democratic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, recent years have brought growing concern over a decline in democratic quality in several countries in the region. While some research has already been conducted on ongoing processes of democratic backsliding in Eastern Europe, relatively little is known about how citizens’ perspectives on democratic institutions in these countries play into such processes. In theory, positive evaluations of one’s individual and the country’s economic situation and social capital should lead to higher consent to democratic institutions. In this paper, we investigate to what extent underlying value structures such as authoritarian versus libertarian value orientations may inform citizens’ consent or dissent with democratic institutions. In doing so, we examine whether individuals’ perspectives on democracy also hinge upon long-term, rather sticky belief systems, indicating a resistant cleavage along citizens’ value orientations. Furthermore, if citizens tend to dissent with the existing democratic system, authoritarian-leaning leaders may gain more latitude to weaken the present democratic institutional order. To test this argument, we examine the cases of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, three cases typically held to have experienced varying degrees of democratic backsliding in recent years. Comparing citizens’ democratic attitudes in these countries allows us to discuss the societies’ diverging historical and societal trajectories. Comparing European Social Survey (ESS) data at different time points from 2004 to 2019, we explore the value structures in the three countries. We then employ ordered logistic regression models to assess the effect of underlying values, evaluation of economic performance, social capital and social demographics on consent to democratic institutions. The findings suggest that values contribute significantly to the prediction of democratic consent, which implies that citizens’ attitudes towards democracy rely strongly on rigid value systems in both countries. Short-term remedies such as economic growth or resolving policy issues are therefore unlikely to have much effect on increasing individuals’ democratic consent.