The Risk-Participation Paradox: Micro Mechanisms Linking Perceived Risks to Protest Participation

Collective action theory implies that fear of the possible negative consequences of participation in political protests might impede protest action. For instance, a high chance of police attack on protesters in a public demonstration is likely to decrease potential protester willingness to participate. Empirical results, however, show a more complex picture. Sociologists and psychologists reveal a positive correlation between perceived risks and participation in demonstrations. Therefore, the riskier the demonstration is considered to be, the higher the willingness is to participate. Although these results contradict the basic assumptions of sociologists' collective action theory, the risk–protest relation remains under-researched by political sociologists and social movement specialists. The aim of the project is to analyze risk perception and mechanisms linking perceived risks to participation. To avoid shortcomings of former observational research, I use the survey experiment method which is appropriate for analyzing both direct and indirect effects. We conducted two pilot studies in Hungary in 2018 and 2019. The result of the first pilot shows that respondents in the treatment group have significantly higher perceived risks, than the control group average—indicating that the treatment had the desired effect. However, the treatment has no significant effect on willingness to demonstrate. If the retribution cue increased the level of risk but willingness did not change, some factors would have to remain concealed. Based on the literature we suggested that this hidden factor is the emotion of anger. Thus, in the second pilot, we added the measurement of emotions to the questionnaire. Since risks have a negative, but anger has a positive effect on protest willingness, willingness to protest does not change significantly in the treatment group. We suggest that the two effects cancel each other. In the pilot surveys, we also found that party identity correlates with protest willingness and other attitudes, moreover, government-critical protest events (emphasized in the treatments) have an effect on party identity. Namely, there are fewer pro-government sympathizers in the treatment than in the control group. In January 2020, we will conduct the next, third experiment, in which we will use two different treatments. In order to reduce the moderator effect of political identities, we will leave out party politics, and we will concentrate on a conflict at the city-level. Thus, with this experiment, we can test the pure deterrence effect independent of political identities.