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A Variety of Contexts in Contextualism as a Method in Political Philosophy

Political Theory
Analytic
Methods
Ethics
Normative Theory
Sune Lægaard
University of Roskilde
Sune Lægaard
University of Roskilde

Abstract

Contextualism in political philosophy is a methodological approach according to which attention to context is crucial in normative political argument. Contextualism takes many forms, some not explicitly labelled as such, including doctrines of practice-dependence, Oakeshottian ideas of politics as the pursuit of intimations, as well as elements of realist political theory and critical theory approaches. Existing literature on contextualism roughly divides into two parts. One part consists of substantive work by theorists who espouse a contextualist approach but who often do not set out in much detail in which way their work is contextualist or what their contextualism consists in as a method. The other part consists of methodological discussions of contextualism, which are mainly critical and focus on problems in defining and defending contextualism. Therefore, while many political theorists agree on the need for attention to context, there is relatively little clarity concerning what contextualism as a method actually involves. The present paper seeks to contribute towards a more positive articulation of contextualism as a method in political philosophy and a clearer understanding of how facts about specific contexts can inform normative judgments about cases in the context in question. The paper proposes to do this by drawing on two well-known ideas from the philosophy of language and the philosophy of science, namely the idea of intensional contexts and the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Criticisms have revolved around the worry that contextualism involves a fallacy of inferring ought from is, might reify contingent facts, or might have a conservative bias. These types of worry assume that contextualism takes contextual facts as given in normative arguments. The paper suggests that such worries might be productively answered (if not entirely resolved) by attention to the nature of the facts in question. Contextual facts can be about the historical context of actions, or institutions, or the social understandings prevalent in a given situation. Contextual facts can thus be intentional contexts in the sense that they describe what people believe about their situation. Such beliefs can concern factual matters (e.g., how many immigrants there are in their country, what is legal or illegal, or what the effects of a given policy will be). However, the beliefs in question can also be normative (what is the point and purpose of an institution, what an action expresses, what is a legitimate procedure etc.). The worries concerning contextualism furthermore assume that contextual facts function as premises in normative arguments. Nevertheless, this is not the only or most obvious way of understanding contextualism. Attention to context need not be something that constrains or directs normative conclusions; it can alternatively be a resource for qualifying possible arguments and refining concepts and categories. A possible way to understand this is by way of the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Attention to context might be important for getting new ideas, developing concepts and articulating arguments, even if contextual facts do not function as premises justifying normative judgments.