Administrative Efficiency or Political Reshuffle? The Impact of Portfolio Re-Allocation on the Motivation Potential of Ministry Officials

Despite the broad relevance of ministerial organization, there has been little systematic research of changes in government portfolios. Moreover, the existing literature focuses on its causes and its effects on policy outputs. This paper, on the other hand, studies how portfolio design reforms affect the work motivation of ministry officials. Work motivation is mainly influenced by three basic psychological motives: the performance motive, the affiliation motive and the power motive, all of which can be influenced by the respective working conditions. While a portfolio re-allocation always imposes costs on employees who have to integrate into a new environment, we argue that the justification of changes can at least partly compensate these costs. We expect that a reform perceived to increase efficiency gains higher acceptance than one driven primarily by political calculation. Therefore, the former should be less detrimental for employees’ motivation and consequently productivity. We want to test this thesis using interviews with ministerial officials in two different policy areas: the construction sector and consumer protection. Both areas have undergone several changes in the past legislative period that differed with regard to the dominant reform motive. The paper sheds light on side effects of ministerial reforms on the productivity and work performance of the ministries concerned – a potentially important aspect that has been largely ignored by previous research.