The Pledge Dilemma: How Parties Prioritize Between Short-Term Electoral Benefits and Long-Term Flexibility in Policy-Making When Communicating About Election Pledges

Election pledges commit parties to do something after an election. This commitment informs voters about what to expect if they vote for one of these parties. Moreover, pledges help voters to hold the parties accountable after the election by judging whether they actually get what they expected. Theoretically, voters should therefore prefer parties making election pledges. From the parties’ viewpoint, commitment reduces flexibility after the election, because the parties have determined themselves to one policy direction. Therefore, parties face a pledge dilemma between short-term electoral benefits and long-term flexibility in policy-making. In this paper, I examine how parties solve this dilemma. I expect that minor parties will make more committing pledges than major parties, because, first, they have a lower need for flexibility after the election, and second, they have a higher need for making their policy position clear to the voters. I test this expectation by measuring the extent to which policy statements in party manifestos are containing pledges. I use three measures on the dependent variable: I) The absolute number of pledges in a manifesto, II) The number of pledges in a manifesto relative to other statements (quasi-sentences), and III) The degree of commitment in a manifesto (by changing pledges to a more-or-less concept). My results have important implications for democracy. If parties commit themselves to a high extent, the voters have a higher chance of voting for the party with the best fitting policy preferences. However, commitment decreases the maneuverability of the parties after the election, and parties might end up pursuing second-best policy options, because they need to show their voters that they do what they promised.