Does Competition Trigger Electoral Violence? Evidence from the Second Reform Act

Does an increase in electoral competition trigger the use violence during elections? While several studies show that rising electoral competition increases political tensions, resulting in election violence, others have found no systematic relationship between competition and election violence. We use evidence from the Second Reform Act in England, which extended the franchise to the unskilled urban population in 1967 and thereby significantly increased electoral competition. Exploiting the sharp change in the electorate caused by franchise extension, we isolate the effect of an increase in electoral competition from underlying constituency level traits correlated with the voting population, enabling us to get a better-identified estimate of the causal effect of competition on election violence. Using an original dataset of election-related violent events in each parliamentary constituency at each of the 20 General elections between 1832 and 1914, constructed based on over 22,000 historical newspaper articles from over 600 local and regional newspapers and official election inquiries, we find that the reform resulted in an increase in electoral violence in the subsequent election and that the effect is almost exclusively due to changes in electoral contestation. The increase in election violence, however, dissipates quickly suggesting that candidates rapidly adapt their strategies to changes in electoral circumstances. Our findings contribute to debates on the causes and consequences of electoral violence and democratization.