Presidentialization of Politics in the Context of Judicial Power: the Co­-Existence of the French Head of State and the Constitutional Council

The paper deals with the phenomenon of presidentialization of politics in the Fifth Republic of France from the perspective of the functioning of the judicial branch of government. The presidentialization itself means an increasingly stronger position of the leaders of the executive – presidents or prime ministers (depending on a system of government). In the case of France this generates growing abilities of the head of state to influence processes occurring in other segments of the constitutional system. In the conditions of the Fifth Republic, the aforementioned phenomenon can be observed primarily in relation to the government and parliament, which are the structures incorporated into the semi-presidential system of government. The French Constitutional Council, which is the body controlling the constitutionality of law – but is not a typical constitutional court based on the so-called Kelsenian model – usually remains outside the scope of analysis from the point of view of the presidentialization of politics. The question therefore arises about the existence of a similar process in this field. The aim of the paper is to analyze the strategies of subsequent French presidents, especially after – in terms of influencing the composition of the Constitutional Council, as well as initiating the constitutional review of legal acts adopted by parliament – in order to maximize their own political benefits. Therefore, the influence the president of the Republic is able to exert on the Constitutional Council deserves to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, however, one of the effects of the Constitutional Council’s jurisprudence may also be restrictive verification of legislation promoted by the head of state. The latter can thus be treated as a manifestation of another process: a kind of alternative to the presidentialization of politics, which is its constitutionalization (as part of a broader process of its judicialization). It may be perceived through the prism of judicial activism and understood as a process of introducing, by a constitutional court or a similar body, further limitation on legislative activities (which are mainly inspired, at least in the French case, by presidential governing camps). It all may contribute to hampering the process of presidentialization. The hypothesis suggesting the overlapping of the two phenomena requires further investigation.