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Social Capital, Leadership and the Resource Users’ Motivations to Engage in Community-Based Management to Address Illegal Fishing: A Case Study from the Spermonde Archipelago, Indonesia

Asia
Elites
Environmental Policy
Local Government
Political Leadership
Public Administration
Social Capital
Corruption
Philipp Gorris
Osnabrück University
Philipp Gorris
Osnabrück University

Abstract

This study focuses in the organizational dimension of community-based management (CBM) approaches to address illegal fishing in the Global South. Marine resources are in a state of advanced degradation worldwide and illegal fishing remains one of the most severe threats for marine ecosystems and their associated natural resources. The work of Elinor Ostrom and colleagues shows that local governance approaches based on cooperation are often better suited for addressing the roots of unsustainable resource use than centrally organized solely government-driven approaches. However, CBM does not automatically lead to the emergence of effective local rules and more research is needed to understand the success factors of effective CBM initiatives. Extensive empirical data was collected from the Indonesian Spermonde Archipelago to examine why some communities address destructive and illegal fishing practices through effectively enforced local rules while others do not. The Spermonde Archipelago is home to one of the largest coral reef fisheries in Indonesia and illegal fishing, such as blast and poison fishing, is practiced all over the archipelago. In response to the limited state capacity to enforce fishery policy, agreements between fishers are put in place that constitute informal rules. Such rules are instituted in some island communities, whilst not in others. A mixed methods approach was used to collect qualitative and quantitative data from four island communities in the archipelago; two of which instituted effective local rules while the other two are heavily engaged in bomb and poison fishing. An adapted version of the qualitative participatory research method “Net- Map” (n=2) is used to examine and visualize knowledge about the interplay of formal and informal social relations and the influence different relevant actors exert on resource use. Semi-structured Interviews with key informants (n=28) from the village to the provincial level are used to understand the fishers’ motivations to engage in CBM. A social network analysis based on interviews with actors (n=105) involved in marine resource governance from multiple levels in the administrative hierarchy (local to provincial level) is used to understand how local actors are entangled in the wider regional governance network. The results show that CBM, even in what seems to be a small community, is influenced by clashes of divergent local interests and by “trans-local” relationships which create complex socio-economic and political interdependencies. Especially short-term economic rationales affect the fishers’ motivation to engage (or not) in implementing and enforcing local rules. Moreover, the network analysis emphasizes the role of social relationships of local leaders within and beyond the community that create different types of social capital. Different types of social capital of local leaders seem to either secure high profits generated by local elites, or support the leaders’ effort to fight illegal fishing through local institutions. Free-rides on fishing rules appear especially common where local leader hold strong broker positions in the multi-level marine governance system that help to protect local resource users from prosecution for infringements.