The Social Policy Impact of Trade Unions: People Power or Elite Networks?

A large literature argues that the strength of trade unions is an important determinant of welfare state generosity. However, existing scholarship in comparative social policy almost exclusively equates ‘union strength’ with union density (the proportion of workers who are union members). We argue that this conceptualization ignores a substantial literature on party–union ties that highlights the many other channels of influence that unions may use to promote their members’ interests. To address this shortcoming, we provide a novel measure of personal linkages between unions and government parties based on a (partly automated, partly manual) coding of around 4,000 ministerial biographies in Western Europe. We use this measure to analyze for the first time how the generosity of unemployment benefits is affected by two channels of union influence: ‘people power’ (union density) vs. elite networks (personal party–union linkages). Our analysis thus contributes to a deeper understanding of the potential and limitations of union influence on social policy in the age of union membership decline.