Do military missions change the character of the EU’s foreign involvement? This article answers this question by empirically assessing the EU’s external policy instruments and its pursued objectives in the case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYR Macedonia). This way it contributes to the debate between contrasting theories on how military means will affect the character of the EU’s foreign policies. Whereas some argue that the EU’s normative character in foreign affairs is strengthened by its military capabilities (Sjursen 2006), others claim that the mere possession of military means precludes a label as normative power (Smith 2005) or that the EU never has been a normative power, but is just as a realist power as all other international actors (Hyde-Price 2006). On the basis of extensive document analysis (e.g. Council Joint Decisions and Country Strategy Papers), secondary literature and interviews with policy-makers and politicians from relevant EU institutions, the study gives an in-depth account of the EU’s involvement with FYR Macedonia over time, from 1991 until 2005. It provides a way of systematically studying the EU’s proclaimed “normative power” in relation to its military means. In addition to an analysis of the EU’s policy objectives in terms of the extent to which they are phrased in terms of a value-based logic, which is in accordance with a normative approach, or a utility-based logic, which is in line with a (neo-) realist approach, also the embeddeness of the military operation within the existing policy and the authorization of the military operation are taken into account. The study concludes that Operation Concordia has not fundamentally changed the character of the EU’s involvement with FYR Macedonia; the EU’s use of military means no evidence is found of a (further) “militarization” of the character of the EU’s foreign policy.
