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‘Dis-united we stand’: The EU’s initial response to the Corona pandemic

European Union
Integration
Political Economy
Zbigniew Truchlewski
The London School of Economics & Political Science
Zbigniew Truchlewski
The London School of Economics & Political Science
Waltraud Schelkle
The London School of Economics & Political Science

Abstract

When Covid-19 rapidly unfolded in spring 2020, why was the EU’s initial response to Southern Europe’s call for support so hesitant and cold? The EU had a commissioner for crisis management and a crisis support instrument at its disposal. Incumbents facing Eurosceptic challenger parties at home had a strong incentive to support their Italian and Spanish counterparts. Yet, when the EU activated the Civil Protection Mechanism upon Italy’s request, silence was the stern reply from other member states; the demand for corona bonds was greeted with a lecture about lack of preparation in good times. Some imposed export bans on medical equipment, while Chinese, Cuban and Russian authorities sent help. In this article, we analyse this PR disaster as a recurrent pattern that warrants explanation because it may indicate a deeper political malaise and structural weakness in the EU polity. One possible explanation is institutional: the pandemic was a type of crisis that favours the response mode of emergency politics in which collective action problems among diverse member states and weak policy resources at the EU level conspire to create mutual blockage. An alternative explanation sees this as the outcome of strategic choices: Italy, in cooperation with eight other member states, tried to leverage the crisis for path-breaking fiscal reform, notably corona bonds, while those opposed and fiscally more resourceful used the power asymmetry in their favour to hold out. Our empirical approach constructs a timeline of responses and uses text analysis of public statements in five key member states - France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain - to evaluate the strength of these institutional and power asymmetry explanations. The paper contributes to the broader literature on the sources of polity fragility and resilience during crises.