Representation in autocracies: How presidents try (and fail) to increase and control regime support

Increasingly studies of authoritarianism have investigated how autocracies create institutions to provide political and social representation, thereby giving these regimes legitimacy. By analysing three post-Soviet autocracies the paper assesses how authoritarian regimes develop methods for increasing political and social representation. Investigation of three case studies provides analysis of the different techniques developed by individual autocracies and the successes and failures of each. By analysing the cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the paper shows that these three autocracies have developed different techniques for how presidents try (and often fail) to increase and control regime support. However, to what extent do presidents try to increase and control regime support? When the regime experiences mass protest do these representative structures function, and if so provide the regime with support? Different and similar representative techniques have been developed in the three case studies. Two parallels between all three states are the charisma leader – especially so in Belarus and Kazakhstan – and control of most media. However, the three cases have developed different techniques to one another. Whether that is the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, rather than parliament, or the listening regime in Kazakhstan. A final question that the paper analyses, is the assessment of the current protests in Belarus, and how these were caused by the failure of regime representative structures. This example will answer whether autocracies can develop effective representative structures and what happens when an autocracy appears to be failing and whether representative structures survive, function, and are anything more than feeble entities.