Affirmative Action in the Political Domain

Affirmative action continues to receive attention in public and scholarly debates. Defenders of affirmative action contend that in the non-ideal circumstances in which we find ourselves, affirmative action is a requirement of justice (e.g. Beauchamp, 2002; Nagel, 2003; Sterba in Cohen and Sterba, 2003). Opponents of affirmative action, on the other hand, contend that affirmative action is unjust, for one because it is effectively a form of reverse discrimination (e.g. Cohen in Cohen and Sterba, 2003; Hook, 2002; Pojman, 2014). This paper argues that three prominent arguments in favour of affirmative action—the mitigating discrimination, the equality of opportunity and the diversity arguments—may be based on a relational egalitarian understanding of justice, as opposed to a distributive understanding of justice. Whereas a distributive understanding of justice focuses on distributions, relational egalitarians say that what ultimately matters for justice it that people relate as equals, as opposed to inferiors and superiors. Affirmative action is usually discussed in relation to university admissions and in hiring for jobs. Basing the arguments in favour of affirmative action on relational egalitarianism has an interesting implication for the site(s) of affirmative action: it implies, all else equal, that we have more reason to pursue affirmative action in the political domain than in university admissions and in hiring for jobs. This is the case because the political domain is a particularly important constituent of relating as equals since political decisions (i) cannot usually be escaped at will; (ii) have final de facto authority; and (iii) involve force (Kolodny, 2014; cp. Anderson, 1999: 313). In non-ideal circumstances, the political domain may thus be a particularly important site in which to improve the standing of a disadvantaged group vis-á-vis other groups. Affirmative action in the political domain may be, as it were, an efficient ‘relations booster.’ Finally, the paper discusses two different ways of pursuing relational egalitarian-based affirmative action in the political realm, to wit, by giving a greater voting weight to members of the disadvantaged group than to members of other groups (the differential voting weights solution) or by reserving seats in parliament to members of the disadvantaged group (the quota solution). Importantly, these solutions are not mutually exclusive. An interesting implication of this paper is that in circumstances in which people do not relate as equals—as is the case in most actual democracies—we have a pro tanto reason of relational egalitarian justice to pursue affirmative action in the political domain by deviating from a “one person, one vote” scheme.