Building a better future? Myopia in the EU’s building and renovation policy

This paper investigates the level of short-termism or myopia of recent climate and energy policy in the EU and its legislative actors. Building on literature on democratic myopia and EU climate policy, it offers an assessment and explanation of short-termism in the EU and its institutions. Specifically, the paper focuses on the Energy Performance for Buildings Directives of 2010 and 2018, and the Renovation Wave Strategy included in the European Green (EGD). Due to buildings’ share of greenhouse gas emissions (36%) and of energy consumption (40%), the long lifespan of buildings and of their energy infrastructures, and considerations of energy justice, buildings constitute a prime arena for examining the EU’s level of myopia. As the concept of myopia has not been applied yet to the EU level, the paper investigates the drivers and barriers of short-termism of the main legislative actors – the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of Ministers. This allows for a comparison between the institutions and a better understanding of what facilitates or impedes the EU’s transition to a low-carbon society. First, to study to what extent the EU and its institutions have a long-term orientation in their climate policy, this paper first develops and applies a measurement tool of short-termism. The tool takes into account three aspects: (1) which energy standards are required for EU policy to be long-term beneficial, (2) the probability that these standards will be met, and (3) mechanisms for further developing and revising the policies. Second, to explain the different levels of short-termism of the European institutions investigated, we examine institutional differences between the actors (including decision-making procedures, time cycles, continuity, temporal autonomy and institutional openness) while taking some control variables into account (public opinion, focus events). The analysis will be based on a triangulation of methods and sources. The data collection will rely on the literature on the role and design of the institutions, secondary literature, media reports, and data (where appropriate and available). At the core of the analysis will be interviews with EU policymakers, experts from NGOs, think tanks and business groups. While the analysis is still ongoing, we expect that the European Parliament will have a rather long-term time horizon due to the absence of a government-opposition dynamic, the continuation of legislative initiatives across electoral cycles, the perception of second-order elections and a distance from voters, single majority voting and a high institutional openness to diffuse interests. The Commission as a “hybrid institution” contains aspects that could steer it towards the short- or the long-term. The position and preferences of the Commission President will most likely have a decisive influence on the Commission’s level of myopia due to the increased politization of the Presidency. Finally, the Council is expected to be the most myopic due to its strong link to domestic and electoral concerns in the Member States, its low institutional openness, and its decision-making based on qualified majority voting or unanimity.