Voting Advice Applications: Limits and Promises

This paper assesses voting advice applications (VAAs) from the perspective of distributive justice and democratic theory. It asks first which distribution of VAA use we should prefer and then examines what limits there are to VAAs when considered from a perspective of democratic theory. Regarding the first, the paper concludes that we should prefer the distribution of the effects of VAAs to be unequal in a way, which counteracts existing participatory inequalities. It then rebuts possible counterarguments based on distributive principles of luck egalitarian, prioritarianism, and sufficientarianism. The second discussion points to shortcomings of VAAs in the sense that many important aspects of democracy and voting, which VAAs do not capture. The paper shows this to be true both from within spatial theories of voting, to which VAAs are typically related and from broader theories of what it means to vote well. As the spread and use of VAAs increase, the second kind of concerns may become more prominent. The final part of the paper evaluates various counterarguments to the concerns raised. The arguments addressed here pertain to whether VAAs are held to an unreasonable high standard regarding what it is taken to task for not achieving.