ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

ECPR

Install the app

Install this application on your home screen for quick and easy access when you’re on the go.

Just tap Share then “Add to Home Screen”

The Pathologies of Party Primaries and their Possible Solutions

Bill Cross
Carleton University
Bill Cross
Carleton University

Abstract

The Pathologies of Party Primaries and their Possible Solutions When parties adopt primaries to select their leaders or candidates, it is usually perceived as a positive step towards the realization of democracy. Yet, the increase in the inclusiveness of the selectorate creates incentives for various types of behaviour by those who are involved in the selection that may undermine the democratic celebration. In other words, primaries may reward problematic and even corrupt practices. The incentive to register as many supporters as possible brings with it low quality party membership. Because primaries are large scale (s)elections they also open the door for the potential corrupting influence associated with the need to raise significant amounts of money to fund these campaigns. They also open the door for the influence of forces and individuals who can recruit and mobilize members and supporters, using problematic bases for these such as patron client and kinship networks. The contest is usually personal, and does not have much to do with values and policies. The selectorates may be highly unrepresentative of the party electorate, which may create a problem when the selected have to satisfy two different principals, the party selectorate and the general electorate. These phenomena pose a challenge to political parties. If they choose to seriously monitor and regulate primaries they may create the impression that a lot of corruption is to be found within their ranks, and this is often on the eve of a general election. But if they turn a blind eye, they may find themselves condoning corrupt practices and taken over by outside forces. If the parties ask the state to regulate their primaries, they give up a significant degree of their autonomy. Moreover, they may also find themselves highly regulated while their less democratic competitors keep their doors closed and their corrupt practices non-transparent. The paper will focus on the cases of party primaries in the Liberal party of Canada and the Labor party in Israel. These two parties have accumulated experience with several rounds of primaries. The paper begins with examination of the pathologies of primaries in these two countries and then examines responses to these from both the national and the intraparty levels. The last part of the paper will discuss several possible solutions to these problems. Examining the experiences of these parties, with a significant history with primaries, should raise issues of interest to European parties which generally are relative new comers to primaries.