When All Tracks Are Exclusive: Inclusion Dilemmas in Peacebuilding and Dialogues in Ukraine

This presentation is based at the study of inclusion of civil society into peace process in the conflict in and around Ukraine in 2014-2020 by Anne Isabel Holper and Tetiana Kyselova. The study aims to elucidate the reasons underlying the lack of inclusion of Ukrainians with “pro-Russian” political views in peacebuilding and dialogues in Ukraine. Based on an analysis of empirical data from interviews and focus-groups, we argue that the following factors contribute to patterns of willful and unwillful exclusion of this group of Ukrainian citizens from all tracks of the current peace process. First, the focus of the international actors on the inclusion into track I – Minsk negotiation process (Trilateral Contact Group chaired by the OSCE) artificially narrows down inclusion to civil society from the two sides – territories controlled by the Ukrainian government (GCA) and territories not-controlled by the Ukrainian government (NGCA) – the so-called two “people’s republics”. In this configuration, inclusion into Track I completely ignores groups of population which are not associated with the mainstream political views of their respective Governments or representatives, in particular the large group of Ukrainian citizens with “pro-Russian” political views. Furthermore, the absence of a political will and a societal agenda for inclusion of people holding “pro-Russian” political views inside Ukraine also excludes them from the wider societal peacebuilding and dialogue processes at tracks II and III. Second, if a political will for inclusion of “pro-Russian” views ever arises, peace process and facilitated dialogues are still prone to high security and manipulation risks – from threats to physical safety of dialogue participants to fears that Russia may use pro- Russian constituencies, if they are legitimated, to destabilize Ukraine and threaten Ukrainian sovereignty. Whether real or perceived, these fears deter dialogue facilitators from engaging “pro-Russian” views and discourage people from expressing such views as well as from participating in the peace process. Third, even if security risks are mitigated, it remains unclear whom to include because of the agency problem - complex, flexible and shifting nature of identities of people holding “pro-Russian” political views that are not connected to stable indicators such as ethnicity or language. After 2014 this group of people does not have an established constituency or institutional bodies that represent it at the civil society level. Thus, in order to include those people in peace process, one has to first distinguish them from other groups within Ukrainian society, i.e. draw boundaries that can potentially deepen the divides between pro-Russian and other types of Ukrainian identities. Finally, in cases where alleged actors holding “pro-Russian” political views can be identified and included, there is no guarantee that they will express “pro-Russian” views in dialogues: Inclusive dialogue appears to have a tendency to transform one-sided identities into broader identities and thereby again fail to include those “pro-Russian” views into peace process.