Environmental Protectionist Duties as Implied by Kant’s Juridical Postulate of Right

Drawing on distinctive features of the legal and political thought of Kant, it is possible to develop a principled, normative basis for coercible juridical prohibitions against the destruction, damage or degradation of the natural environment, i.e., for positive preservationist duties. Environmental protection, i.e., a prohibition on destruction, non- sustainable use, or abuse of finite, depletable natural resources, especially land, can be, and indeed must be, an imperative of Right. Such prohibitions are a requirement of freedom, which is the basis of Right, lest we fail to make the “greatest use of freedom”. Destructive activities, ultimately, place otherwise useful objects, “external things”, beyond the possibility of (further or future) purposive use, and hence fail to maximize freedom. In this regard, I rely on the observation that Kant’s theory of property, and specifically his Juridical Postulate with regard to Right, demands that ostensibly usable things be treated as being available for use as property (at least in potentia), that we cannot as a matter of Right deprive ourselves of the use of inherently usable things or proceed as if usable things were useless (or res nullius) because, from the standpoint of freedom, this would be self- contradictory (irrational). But, I claim, an inevitable implication of this is that the destructive use of finite, depletable natural resources just is a self-contradictory exercise of freedom, and is hence unrightful, precisely because such activity makes unavailable for (further/future) use external things (resources, land, etc.) that are otherwise, ab initio, available to us, to humanity, as objects of will. Destroying natural resources, in effect, renders them res nullius, exactly in the relevant sense contemplated in Kant’s exposition of the Juridical Postulate. By engaging in activities that destroy or deplete a finite resource, we deprive ourselves of that resource; we engage in a limited form of purposive activity that, at once, negates the possibility of effecting any further purposes via use of that resource. But the Juridical Postulate demands, in effect, that resources be made available for use in perpetuity, and thus sanctions only sustainable use of finite, depletable resources. I also note that destructive use of natural resources or land is normatively parallel to self-mutilation of the living body, i.e., both are similarly and equally irrational and hence impermissible. This means, of course, that contrary to a Blackstonean, absolutist, or “despotic”, conception of property rights, our freedom vis-à-vis the natural environment must be limited, precisely, for the sake of freedom itself. So, whatever use-rights are inherent to property ownership, a right to destroy cannot, logically, be among them. Put differently, my claim is that the Kantian Juridical Postulate entails strictures somewhat analogous to the well-known Lockean provisos with respect to legitimate property holdings, and especially Locke’s (more neglected) second proviso against waste and spoilage in the use of one’s holdings. (I further support my arguments via brief reference to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, primarily his understanding of the underlying normative import of property as stated in the section on Abstract Right.)