Regulatory Agencies in the age of democratic backsliding: An analysis of the Turkish case

This paper examines the major shifts in economic governance in Turkey in the context of increasing centralization, right-wing populism, democratic backsliding and de-Europeanization. Focusing on regulatory agencies (RAs), the paper aims to undestand the variations regarding their institutional constellations, both on paper and in practice; and construct analytical links between transformtions of RAs and the regime change from parliamentary to presidential system. It analyzes the processes in which shifting executive-legislative relations, executive’s relative empowerment and ultimately the transition to a hyper-presidential system have altered the political opportunity structures for pivotal actors. It suggests that diminishing number of veto players engenders a hirerarchically centralized economic governance structure where RAs are either margninalized or divorced from independence. The paper points out the nearly paradoxical impact of the EU accession through the prism of a double-edged sword: first, promoting (and/ or imposing) decentralized governance in designated areas and providing templates for such change; and then, enabling centralization (evidently as an unintended consequence) by contributing to enhancing bureaucratic capacity and strengthening of ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) political base through myriad mechanisms.