Searching for Lithuanian way of defence

Events in Ukraine in 2014 became a catalyst of big changes for the Lithuanian state and its defence politics. It fast-tracked increase of record breaking defence budget, pushed through major military procurement projects, actively lobbied Western allies to take serious look into the defence of NATO’s Eastern flank and to deploy units into the region and finally made a political decision to bring back conscription. Unprecedented activity and mobilization of the Lithuanian society equalled governmental actions. Suddenly individuals, groups of volunteers expressed their interest in defending the state. Yet, this sudden interest in defence pushed into the open all tensions and disagreements among different groups inside military and interested civilian circles. After regaining its independence, Lithuania had to build its armed forces from the scratch. It adapted best Western institutional and conceptual practises. All of that led to variety of unresolved conceptual, doctrinal, political issues. Lithuanian military officially indicates, that its major approach to war is manoeuvrist approach. The military, which approaches issues of warfare from the perspective of manoeuvrist approach, tends to see society more as a junior, passive partner. It leads to assumptions that victory or successes in military confrontations happens only due to actions, taken by the military. Therefore, when Ukrainian crisis started and Lithuanian society expressed its willingness and ability to take part in state’s defence military was taken aback and, while being happy with society’s enthusiasm, tried to curb it. While acknowledging legacies of post-war resistance and civic resistance in late 1980’s armed forces managed in public discourse, reduce notion of Lithuania’s defence to the question of Suwalki gap. Defence of this particular territory became an axis of defence planning. For many inside Lithuanian military and amongst the allies Suwalki gap question reminds late Cold war and Fulda gap story. The mere fact of comparing Suwalki question to Fulda gap is very telling. American reductionism of defence against Soviets and concentration on Fulda then faced many critics. It seems, now the same story is unfolding in Lithuania. In America educated Lithuanian officers and soldiers are inclined to see defence of Suwalki gap not as one of key points of state’s defence, but as the only one. Lithuanian constitution clearly states, that it is the right and duty off all citizens to defend country from the acts of aggression with all means necessary. Major laws, concerning role of armed forces, elaborates it by stating, that states defence rests on three pillars: ability to fight conventional wars; ability to fight as insurgents and ability to resist using civil, non-defensive resistance. This, three-pillar system was borrowed from Swedish model of total defence. Yet, it also reflected the historical narrative, which emphasizes defence of the state to the last. Because of that, members of society wants to have more active role and say on defence questions. However, it almost automatically leads to the clash with armed forces, where operational thinking about dominance of manoeuvre prevails.