Change for continuity: Misfit and the customization of European Renewable Energy Policy

This paper uses the institutional misfit model to analyze why member states customize the European Union’s (EU) mandatory renewable energy (RE) targets. Getting member states to rely on more sustainable energy was an important goal of the EU’s Energy 2020 strategy. In 2009 the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) posed mandatory RE targets for member states to reach until 2020. Although there was no harmonization of support schemes, the directive included many additional provisions regarding national action plans, administrative procedures, grid expansion and building regulations, which created considerable adaptation pressure on national institutions. Combining an institutional with an actor centred approach, the theory of institutional misfit argues that, for successful implementation, an EU policy has to pass two levels: the institutional level and the actor or preference level. If an EU policy does not fit national regulatory institutions and national actors’ policy preferences, this is a crucial hurdle for successful policy implementation (Börzel 2000; Knill und Lenschow 1998); Waarden (1995), Knill und Lehmkuhl (2002). EU induced institutional change is possible, but only in cases where adaptation pressure remains moderate and policy preferences of key national actors align with European policy goals and provisions. The goodness of fit hypothesis has had mixed success in explaining the legal compliance of member states. However, although Europeanization research has highlighted the many forms and degrees of domestic change (Börzel und Risse 2003; Héritier et al. 2001), by focusing on legal compliance misfit research usually does not account for ways in which member states might adjust policy requirements to existing institutions and interests (for exceptions, see Falkner et al. 2005; Thomann 2015, 2019). In contrast, the recently posited concept of customization measures how member states change EU rules regarding their density and restrictiveness during legal transposition (Thomann 2015; Thomann und Sager 2017; Thomann und Zhelyazkova 2017). While institutional misfit might not necessarily lead to non-compliance, it might plausibly drive members states’ customization strategies. However, the institutional misfit thesis has never been used to explain customization outcomes. In doing so, we seek to gain a more detailed understanding of EU implementation beyond legal compliance. Empirically, we analyze the implementation of Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC in six countries that were selected based on their variance regarding ‘institutions’ and ‘interests’: Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. To control for administrative and/or judicial capacities, we exclude southern and eastern European member states (Falkner 2010; Falkner und Treib 2008). We combine qualitative case studies with Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to compare configurations of factors leading to different customization outcomes. Although institutional pressure prevailed in all six countries, the overall problem-solving approaches, regulatory paradigms and policy instruments have remained largely intact. The member states all exhibited strong customization tendencies, thereby managing to pursue European and national renewable energy policy goals without threatening existing national arrangements, priorities and preferences. Thus, institutional misfit did not drive institutional change, but instead resulted in various customization strategies designed to preserve national institutions.