Geoeconomics in motion: China and the quest for structural power

China is the second-largest economy in the world, after the US (being the first if we use parity power purchase dollars), it is the world’s biggest trade player, the world’s biggest demographic power (although it should be overcome by India in the near future) and the world’s greatest energy consumer. If we add to this its technological prowess and investment spree, we can definitely assume China to be a geopolitical and geoeconomic player of paramount importance. And China definitely has its geopolitical and geoeconomic goals identified and integrated into a general strategy. In this paper, we propose to apply Susan Strange's concept of structural power to analyze China's rise in the contemporary international order. According to Strange, structural power confers the power to decide how things shall be done, the power to shape frameworks within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate enterprises (States and Markets, 1988). In this context, structural power is defined by four different structures: security, finance, production, and knowledge. Our purpose is to focus on the finance and knowledge dimensions and verify how the Chinese government is using its geoeconomic clout to enhance China's position in the contemporary global order and vis a vis other important players (especially the US), as well as the impact the geoeconomic endeavors might have in the (re)configuration of the current international system. We will discuss the Chinese initiatives to promote the internationalization of the renminbi, such as the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank or the gradual development liberalization of financial markets, and the set of programs designed to improve the technological edges, such as Made in China 2025 or China Standards 2035. Preliminary data seem to indicate that China will achieve its goals in what concerns the knowledge dimension, but will still lag far beyond the US and other players in the finance and monetary realm. We, therefore, conclude that China does not yet fulfill the criteria defined by Susan Strange to achieve and to hold structural power in the contemporary context of international relations.