When do bureaucrats listen? A theoretical model and empirical test of bureaucratic responsiveness

Government agencies must operate in the environments marked by conflicting expectations and demands coming from audiences observing and judging their organizational conduct. Due to the multiplicity and incompatible nature of external accusations, agencies have to prioritize to which public accusations they respond and which ones they disregard. However, to date the idea of differentiated government agencies’ response to external signals is in a black box as it is largely unknown how and why agencies prioritize when adhering to public accusations containing incompatible demands. This article, therefore, proposes a Bureaucratic Responsiveness Framework (BRF) that is developed by synthesizing existing theoretical expectations about bureaucratic behavior. The study aims to test competing expectations about bureaucratic responsiveness derived from Organizational, Principal-Agent, and Bureaucratic Reputation approaches. Against this theoretical background, the research question is: Under what conditions are agencies responsive to public accusations? To test the hypotheses regarding the effects of diverse public accusations on bureaucratic responsiveness, we draw on a unique conjoint experiment among bureaucrats working at EU-level agencies.