The Deliberative Constitution: Lotteries in Denmark's 1848 Constituent Assembly

A constitution is the foundation of any democracy, and its wording shapes the path of democratic development. Yet how are constitutions drafted, and does deliberation affect the final document? Here, we look at how deliberation in random groups affects legislative behavior during the development of a constitution. In the case of the 1849 June Constitution in Denmark, national policy was deliberated in randomly assigned groups of legislators, and we exploit this natural experiment to test deliberative theories of citizens assemblies. Using a panel of constituent assembly members and roll call votes, we find little evidence for deliberative effects, on either deliberative group cohesion or individual voting behavior. Deliberative effects, where they exist, tend to go in different directions in different groups. Our results highlight the need to better understand promising deliberative mechanisms driving behavior in random assemblies, before transplanting randomization to national arenas where the stakes are high. *Department