Decision-making in the EU under crisis conditions: Covid and refugee crises compared

We study how crises situations shape the political decision-making structure of the EU and the responses adopted by European policy makers by comparing EU decision-making in the first wave of the COVID-19 crisis (March 2020-July 2020) and in the refugee crisis (2015 to 2019), based on a new data-set on policymaking. While the first wave of the COVID-19 crisis was in a class of its own in terms of the salience of EU decision-making and of the policymaking pace, we find a number of similarities between the two crises: decision-making was compa¬rable in terms of polarization and conflict intensity, there was executive dominance in both crises, we found a greater role of EU institutions in policy domains where the EU has higher competence, and more conflict and greater resistance by coalitions of member states in domains where it has lower competence, and minority coalitions of critical member states have been crucial for possible solutions in both crises. The key difference between the two crises lies in the fact that, in the refugee crisis, the opposing coalition was able to prevent any kind of reform, while in the first wave of the Covid crisis, the opposition was more amenable to a joint solution in the crucial fiscal policy domain, where the conflict became most intense. We suggest that this key difference is ultimately rooted in the character of the original problem pressure and the different distribution of spatial incidence in the two crises.