When Leverage Is Not Enough: The EU Democratisation Policy in Central Asia

The paper examines the possibilities and failures of the European Union as a democracy promoter in authoritarian Central Asia, where external democratisation is extremely unlikely to be fruitful. Based on the theoretically derived prerequisites for success of conditionality policy, the paper reviews the instruments available to the EU and traces application of its incentives and sanctions in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, two Central Asian states with different forms of authoritarian rule. While arguing that domestic conditions in the target countries are crucial for the processes of democratisation, the study discovers various misconceptions in the EU’s policy planning and implementation. As the analysis reveals, in ‘soft authoritarian’ Kyrgyzstan, where the European leverage is slightly higher, the EU has never applied political pressure, opting for positive governance conditionality. In contrast, ‘hard authoritarian’ Uzbekistan, where the EU leverage is extremely low, became a target of EU sanctions following a severe human rights breach by the government. However, inconsistent application of the coercive measures and contradicting interests on the foreign policy agenda of the EU Member States significantly contributed to the failure of the EU conditionality.