The Institutional Politics of the European Union’s Rule of Law Crisis

The implementation of the EU’s provisions regarding the rule of law as enshrined in Article 7 of the Amsterdam Treaty always had the potential for political contestation. The emergence of illiberal governments and subsequent challenges to the primacy of EU law has galvanised such debates. This paper examines the institutional politics and inter-institutional tensions arising from the need for interpretation and implementation of the EU’s various rule of law measures. The paper considers the role of party politics and political contestation concerning Art.7 as well as soft law instruments, consultative mechanisms and infringement procedures. The article proceeds in two stages: first, the response to the crisis of the European Commission, the Council, the European Parliament, and the Court of Justice is being discussed. In doing so, the following questions will be addressed: To what extend have institutional dynamics changed the form and application of available rule of law tools? How can institutional shifts and the emergence of a dominant response to the crisis be explained? In a second stage, the paper charts the outcome of the key inter-institutional relations – between Council and Commission, EP and Commission and EP and Council – before arriving at an overall assessment of the institutional politics of the EU’s response to the rule of law crisis. The paper concludes with an outlook on future developments in this field on the basis of the preceding analysis.