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Party Primaries in Germany – What do party activists think about this “democratic revolution” and are they veto-players in party reforms?

Sebastian Bukow
Heinrich Böll Foundation
Sebastian Bukow
Heinrich Böll Foundation

Abstract

The paper discusses intra-party functioning and acceptance of primaries as a new organizational mode of intra-party decision making. Thus it does not (mainly) focus on already implemented and held primaries. Instead it focuses on the assumed effect of primaries as seen by party activists and party convention delegates. This assumed effect of primaries on the distribution of power within the organizational structures of parties might have a most important effect on the question, whether intra-party veto players (in this case the activists/delegates) support party organizational reforms, aiming to implement primaries, whether they do not support them. And as mentioned in the call for papers, the introduction of party primaries can be seen as a (maybe unavoidable) next step in the organizational evolution of political parties as shrinking membership-based organizations. These assumed intra-party effects of primaries in German membership-oriented and representative-democratically organized party organizations have not really been researched yet. Especially the connection between activists’ assumptions and their support for party reforms aiming to introduce primaries are still unconsidered in party research. And as recent reforms in Germany show, parties do have big problems implementing primaries, if primaries include non-members in intra-party decision making processes. But even member-exclusive primaries and grass-root elements are seldom used in German parties. They are mostly used in times of crises as a democratic problem-solving method only. In spite of this, in the past few years – connected to participatory change and the reemerged grass-roots threats for German politics (so called “Wutbürger”- “enraged citizen”) – party change debates have taken place, which put emphasis on ‘grass-roots democratization’ of parties, which means: Primaries, allowing participation of members and even non-members. In this conflict parties have to find a way of institutional renewal, and therefore party activists and party officials are most important players. They discuss and enact reforms at party conventions, and they have the power to delay or stop far-reaching reforms concerning this new mode of (intra-)party governance. Due to this, the paper addresses problems caused by the formal and organizational implementation of party primaries and will discuss these on the basis of valid empirical data. As recent research show, inventing party primaries is not fully supported by party members and it is said to be similar with party activists/delegates. Using a mixed-method design, qualitative and quantitative data is used for this paper focussing on party activists/delegates (qualitative: esp. party documents, process analysis and interviews with reform-relevant persons in the party central office; quantitative: questionnaire of all delegates at the SPD party convention in December 2011, which decides the reform and the invention of primaries). In a first step the paper wants to develop a theoretical framework, esp. referring to organisational theory and actor-centered institutionalism. It will then address the question what party activists expect from party primaries, which intra-party effects they assume and mainly how these assumptions influence their attitude towards these grass-roots elements. Therefore, the recent SPD reform will be analysed as a case study. These assumed effects might be most important in German parties, where party primaries for non-members are restricted by normative and legal aspects and even member-exclusive primaries can hardly be implemented.