Does size really matter? Framing the Commission’s preferences and strategies in European budgetary politics

Budgets are economic instruments to achieve political priorities and, therefore, they usually give rise to power struggles among competing actors. The EU budgetary literature has served well the purpose of depicting these intense confrontations, especially concerning the long-term budgetary procedure. What is still missing, however, is a detailed account of the European Commission in this policy domain. The European executive is expected to constantly advocate for budget-maximisation. This assumption, pertinent to the Delors Commission, finds lesser evidence in the following Colleges, with the possible exception of the last Multiannual Financial Framework. How to explain the apparent restraint of the Commission? Traditional theories of European integration assume that the Commission has a duty, a mission, or a rational interest to strive for more Europe. The Commission is thus conceived as a purposeful entrepreneur with a constant preference for further integration but flexible strategies. When the Commission does not pursue a budget-maximisation approach, it is because of an external hostile environment and structural pressures. This perspective, however, tells only part of the story. What if the changing role of the Commission could be explained in terms of strategies and preferences? New intergovernmentalism offers new theoretical lenses to investigate the role of this institution, drawing its assumptions also from specific studies on the preferences of the Commission. The image of the pragmatic entrepreneur, as opposed to the purposeful entrepreneur, is better suited to explain the Commission’s role in the integration process. This perspective suggests that the Commission is less idealistic about its role in the integration process, more presidential, and more politicised. This paper discusses the merits of this new theoretical approach to the study of the Commission’s role in European budgetary politics.