Opposing integration? “Democratic backsliders” in EU decision-making

Do governments engaged in democratic backsliding oppose European integration by rejecting new legislation and seeking opt-outs from EU rules? With research showing that the EU is unlikely to overcome democratic backsliding quickly or reliably, we need to understand what it means that backsliding governments will participate in decision-making for the foreseeable future. Looking beyond Eurosceptic rhetoric for domestic audiences, this study discusses the incentives of backsliders and examines implications for key inputs and outputs of decision-making. The autocratization projects of backsliding governments benefit from European integration in most policy domains. Moreover, in the policy domains in which backsliders have potentially significant reason to oppose integration, the EU’s competences remain weak. It should thus be expected that the impact of democratic backsliding on decision-making remains limited, which is a likely reason for why the EU’s efforts to reign in backsliding have remained moderate. There are, however, select areas in which backsliders are likely to oppose integration when the EU exercises or seeks to develop competences in these areas.