Experimentalist Governance – An Antidote to EU Member States’ Institutional Persistence?

This paper presents results of a case study on the implementation of the EU Renewable Energy Directive from 2009 (RED I) in six Member States (Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK). Through a theoretical lens that combines a historical institutionalist perspective with an actor-centred analysis (Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002), it is shown how Member States’ institutional arrangements, specifically their regulatory styles (Waarden 1995) vis-à-vis the regulation of the energy sector, resulted, to a large degree, in the reaffirmation and recreation of policy preferences and regulatory approaches during Member States’ implementation of the EU policy. Although all Member States under study actively reacted to EU adaptation pressure, institutional persistence was observed in all cases. Based on these empirical findings, the main argument of the paper centres around the concept of experimentalist governance (Rangoni/Zeitlin 2020; Zeitlin 2016) as a promising approach to improving the governability of the European Union, specifically in light of institutionally founded implementation challenges. In comparing the governance approach reflected in RED I and the current European Green Deal framework, I analyse to what extent the respective governance approaches are in line with the tenets of experimentalist governance. I then discuss whether an only partial commitment to experimentalist governance, e.g. the absence of an actually enforceable overarching goal, might create new pitfalls without solving old challenges.