Between the Parish and the Levers of Power: Strategies of the Anti-gender Movement in Croatia

This article analyzes the formation of radical-right movement parties in Croatia through qualitative data collected by interviewing members of Croatian religious right movement actors. Twenty-one in-depth interviews have been conducted with founders, leaders, and coordinators of various citizen initiatives, NGOs, and political representatives of the Christian right. Unified around the issue of combatting ‘gender ideology’, they represent the central social movement organizations (SMOs) of the Croatian anti-gender movement. The interview subjects’ membership often overlaps between political parties and SMOs, thus providing valuable insight into the actors’ strategic considerations and perceptions of political opportunity. The data was collected as part of a broader research project comparing the emergence of anti-gender movements in Croatia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The period under observation includes 10 years, several electoral cycles and follows the emergence of various SMOs over time. The data points to several emerging conclusions. First, religious right actors collectively identify with an ideologically cohesive anti-gender movement while differing in their strategies and preferences towards engaging with party politics. Some actors opted for a long-term strategy of developing movement resources, organizations, and cultural repertoires via direct engagement with local communities, parishes, and charity work. Others went on to form new movement parties, competing electorally on an anti-gender platform and championing family values. The radicality of frames and preferences for tactics of populist polarization seem to be much higher in the latter group. Second, the movement actors’ perceptions of political opportunities are primarily conditioned by their assessment of the ruling centre-right party, HDZ. The SMO leaders explicitly identify the perceived moderation and liberalization of HDZ as a motive for movement-party formation. Although early movement parties such as HRAST and the Family Party were created simultaneously, if not prior to anti-gender SMOs, their electoral failures prompted direct engagement in civil society through public awareness campaigns, referenda, protest marches and petitions. Building on the victory of the 2013 marriage referendum, some anti-gender entrepreneurs used this political capital to form new movement parties. This was further motivated by perceived HDZ-led state repression of their activities, which prompted conclusions that, as one movement leader stated, ‘acting within civil society is not enough when you don’t control the levers of power’. Finally, the Croatian case demonstrates how the lines between movement and party actors in the religious right sector are ultimately blurred, with different actors strategically choosing and switching between movement and party politics as different means to achieve the same goal. This goal is, namely, to roll back liberal policies in areas of gender, sexuality, and reproductive rights of women, as well as reclaiming cultural hegemony. Interviewees explicitly recount how movement networks of lay Catholics and parishes were used as a recruiting pool for new party cadres. Overall, it seems that the religious right movement field has evolved over time towards a division of labour between various repertoires of action, issues, and corresponding organizational structures. This paper can contribute to current discussions on the interactions and strategies of radical right movements and parties in Central and Eastern Europe.