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Dodging the Fight? Explaining the European Parliament’s Reluctance to Counter Informalization of EU Readmission Policy

Democracy
European Politics
European Union
Migration
European Parliament
Davide Gnes
University of Amsterdam
Davide Gnes
University of Amsterdam
Milka Sormunen
University of Helsinki

Abstract

In the external dimension of European Union (EU) migration policy, researchers have observed an increasing reliance on non-binding readmission arrangements since 2016. These informal arrangements eschew procedures explicitly laid out in the Treaties and side-line the European Parliament in their creation and monitoring. This development stands in contrast to the post-Lisbon Parliamentarization trend, since Parliamentary powers of scrutiny and legislation are severely curtailed in a policy area where the Parliament’s consent is required for formal readmission agreements. In this paper, we analyse the Parliament’s behaviour in light of its diminished prerogatives drawing on a qualitative analysis of Parliamentary policy and legislative documents (2014-2021), LIBE Committee hearings as well as interviews with Members of the Parliament and Parliamentary advisors. In line with previous literature on Parliamentarisation, we would have expected the Parliament to swiftly act to protect its prerogatives by resorting to all (or most of the) actions at its disposal, such as threatening the executive with (legal and political) sanctions, linking issues and policy arenas, building alliances with other actors outside and inside the institutions, and/or engaging in public shaming. However, while the Parliament has employed some of such actions, as of late 2021 it has not relied on its most impactful supervisory and budgetary powers. Most notably, it has not legally challenged the conduct of the European Commission and of the Council of the EU in readmission policy. We rely on rational choice and constructivist theories to explain the Parliament’s reluctance to use all available strategies to counter informalization. Our findings question the assumption that the Parliament has steadily gained influence and powers vis-à-vis other EU institutions and aim to contribute to the literature on the impact of soft law and informalization on inter-institutional relations in the EU.