The reasons for good reasons: two complimentary conceptions of normative agency

In this paper, I will explore from a conceptual perspective, what it means to be human, and why it matters in the context of epistemic justice, agency and flourishing. This approach aims to realign our discussions in epistemology towards one that is informed in important senses by ethical and conceptually sound notions of human nature. Firstly, I will explore tensions between what I call two central forms of normative agency. I will explicate the notion of “normative agency (A)”: this is a categorial and criterial remark with regards to ethical conceptions of human nature, human two-way agential powers, and unique human abilities. I will aim to highlight how this form of normative agency is authoritive and, as I will suggest, is not subject to any substantial degree of epistemic doubt or dispute. As I will suggest, claims with regards to a putative human nature need not be couched in metaphysical, spiritualist or naive notions of western enlightenment. Rather, our conceptions of human agency should be understood in ways that are first and foremost categorial and criterial but are informed by the lived practices of human beings. This will be important for guiding ethical conceptions of what I term as normative agency (B) which, I suggest, is guided by social and political conceptions of agency. This second order concept is subject to a greater degree of political debate, deliberation and decision, though it remains limited in important senses by the conceptual criteria of normative agency (A). Better understanding these distinctions will help to inform why certain epistemic practices are more harmful and unethical than others. Secondly, as Fricker (2008) points out, not all knowers are given the same degree of ‘testimonial’ authority. Indeed, her notion of being wronged in one’s ‘capacity as a knower’ constitutes the generic characterization of epistemic injustice (cf. Fricker, 2008). In the context of the pandemic, the debates on who can say or do what in the epistemic realm has seemingly never been so fierce (cf. Hannon, 2021). On the one hand, quite understandably, we have well-reasoned arguments and practices for developing hierarchies of knowledge that are domain specific; that is, we allow ‘credibility’ for expert or specialist sources. On the other, citizens have been treated as less than rational agents, expected to defer judgment on important matters of personal health and daily living. This I suggest, amounts to a form of epistemic injustice because it fails to recognise the ability of ordinary human beings as ‘knowers’ as well as rational agents and citizens. What we know and do depends heavily on one form of testimonial or another, which is why it truly matters whether our practices of ‘attributing credibility’ are in good conceptual order (cf. Fricker, 2008). Hence, in this paper, I will explore the tensions between those two forms of normative agency (A) & (B), through the lens of Fricker’s (2007) concept of ‘testimonial injustice’. My central aim will be to advocate for what McFee (2000) calls the ‘possibility of genuine agency’ and human flourishing.