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Rally round the Rule of Law? How does EU (in)action affect public opinion in backsliding member states?

European Union
Experimental Design
Public Opinion
Survey Experiments
Daniel Naurin
Universitetet i Oslo
Daniel Naurin
Universitetet i Oslo
Øyvind Stiansen
Universitetet i Oslo

Abstract

How does international organizations' enforcement (or lack thereof) of democracy and rule-of-law standards influence domestic responses to backsliding governments? On the one hand, international relations scholars have argued that a main benefit of international enforcement actions is to provide normative focal points for the mobilization of domestic compliance constituencies and to bestow legitimacy on actors with international law on their side. On the other hand, both scholars and practitioners worry that international enforcement action may create ``rally-around-the-flag" effects that inadvertently increase support for autocratic regimes. Communication scholars suggest that the effect of international enforcement (in)action on domestic politics will depend on how the international response is portrayed in domestic media. We present the pre-analysis plan for a survey experiment designed to assess the likely effect of European Union (EU) action -- or inaction -- in response to rule-of-law backsliding in Poland -- the largest of the EU member states experiencing a serious decline in the rule of law. Our experimental design will randomly assign respondents to information about different forms of EU (in)action in a response to Poland's rule-of-law backsliding. All respondents will receive a short vignette describing the rule-of-law challenges in Poland. The treated respondents will receive additional information, compared to the control group, about hypothetical or actual EU (in)action based on a systematic mapping of possible EU enforcement actions. The experimental treatments will vary along three dimensions. First, we will vary whether respondents receive information about EU action or inaction. By inaction we mean moments where the EU decides not to employ one of its enforcement tools. Second, we will vary which tool is employed, which will also involve varying the EU institution involved. Finally, we will -- building on a separate media analysis -- vary how the information about (the lack of) actions is framed.