Opportunities and limits of presidential activism

Miloš Zeman's presidency (since 2013) in the Czech Republic was characterised by the rhetoric of the (first) directly elected head of state, which shielded his activism. This activism was particularly evident in the nomination powers, especially in the formation of cabinets, and the appointment or dismissal of ministers. Another frequent area of disagreement was foreign policy. The extremely brief constitutional procedure gave Zeman a lot of room for his interpretation of presidential powers. The president has been only minimally active in the area of presidential vetoes of legislation or complaints to the Constitutional Court. This paper takes a comparative perspective on six cabinets during Zeman's presidency. The main aim is to show the structure of political opportunities that have been favourable to presidential activism and, conversely, the limits that constrained this activism. The paper's initial framework is a discussion of the literature on presidential activism, intra-executive conflicts (Sartori 1997, Frye 2002, Shugart 2005, Protsyk 2005 and 2006, Tavits 2009, Sedelius and Ekman 2010, Elgie, Moestrup, Wu 2011, Sedelius and Mashtaler 2013 etc.) and a summary of the behaviour of Zeman's two indirectly elected predecessors, Václav Havel and Václav Klaus. The contribution of the paper is not only to present the structure of political opportunities and the limits of Zeman's behaviour, but also the changes that the direct election of the president has brought to the relations within the executive power in the Czech Republic.