Respected individuals: How state representatives overcome structural constraints in international organizations

Decision-making in many international organizations takes place in the shadow of differences in the representation of member states in decision-making bodies. Yet weak states occasionally block proposals of more powerful states and initiate change themselves. How? Approaches that approximate influence by voting shares and other structural features are ill-suited to explain this phenomenon. In this article, I examine the micro-foundations of state action by looking at the behavior and traits of representatives in governing bodies of international organizations. Drawing on an interdisciplinary literature on negotiation, I identify psychological and social-environmental features of successful negotiators. To assess which of those attributes apply to state delegates in global governance, I have conducted 16 interviews with former members of the International Monetary Fund’s governing body, its Executive Board—a typical case of decision-making in international organizations. Based on the analysis of these interviews, I develop the concept of ‘respected individuals’—state representatives who enjoy particular standing in decision-making bodies. Their influence and prestige depend on two conditions: first, autonomy vis-à-vis their home authorities; and second, relevant experience and negotiation skills. This concept plausibly extends beyond the IMF to other international institutions and multilateral negotiations. Taken together, I show how to combine institutional and individual-level features to advance our understanding of decision-making in international affairs.