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Managing tipping point dynamics - Disentangling 'Warm Glow', Beliefs, and Social Norms

Asia
Climate Change
Decision Making
Experimental Design
Empirical
Energy
Esther Schuch
Research Institute for Sustainability (RIFS) - Helmholtz Center Potsdam (GFZ)
Esther Schuch
Research Institute for Sustainability (RIFS) - Helmholtz Center Potsdam (GFZ)

Abstract

Sociotechnical systems often have nonlinear dynamics such as tipping points which need to be considered. Tipping points are critical thresholds within a system since these points shift the system suddenly from one stable state to another. The tipping point can trigger an improved or a deteriorated situation. Negative tipping points in the energy transition can be the failure to reduce CO2 emissions sufficiently, thus triggering climate change dynamics or more on a local level a deterioration of air quality. Thus, a successful reduction of CO2 emissions that results in an avoidance of climate change dynamics or improved air quality is an example for a positive tipping point. For a long time the narrative surrounding the energy transition was focused on avoiding a catastrophe, which is slowly changing by shifting the focus onto co-benefits of the energy transition. To test whether this shift in the narrative might increase support for the energy transition we perform a threshold public good game in which a threshold has to be reached before cooperation pays off. In particular, we are interested in whether we can see framing effects when presenting the game as a public good (positive tipping points) or a public bad (negative tipping points) game. Previous research has shown that contributions are higher if people aim to achieve something positive ('Warm Glow' of doing something good). Given that the optimal contribution strategy in threshold games depends on the contributions of the partners, we also elicit beliefs about the partners contributions. Lastly, we run an ultimatum game to elicit social norms on what constitutes "fair contributions" which allows us to disentangle the individual contributions towards the energy transition from conditional contribution patterns based on beliefs and social norms.