A technocratic or responsive European Commission? Informational lobbying and agenda-setting influence under quiet and noisy EU politics

This paper analyzes the circumstances under which interest groups’ type of information supply to European Commission (EC) officials affects their chances of wielding agenda-setting influence. Bridging theoretical considerations on bureaucratic reputation with informational lobbying approaches, we argue that groups providing information on audience support are more likely to shape EC policy priorities than groups prioritizing expert information supply. We furthermore expect that this beneficial effect is contingent on the degree of public salience, polarization, and stakeholder mobilization. A novel dataset on the policy views of 158 interest groups concerning 67 policy issues related to European Green Deal initiatives allows us to evaluate this argument. The results suggest that information on audience support trumps the provision of expert information for achieving agenda-setting influence. Moreover, our empirical findings demonstrate that the marginal pay-off of supplying information on audience support increases the more stakeholders mobilize on a policy issue.