The Difference Between Us: The Representation Gap and Determinants of Populist Voting in the EU

Populist radical parties on the right and left of the political spectrum are on the rise across Europe. What draws voters to these parties? We know that populist are united in their rejection of the political establishment, hostility towards globalization, and Euroscepticism. However, populism is, at best, a “thin” ideology, and right and left parties invoke populism in different ways in their attempt to marshal support away from integration and to capitalize on the frustrations of the “losers of globalization.” Radical right parties combine populism with nativism, arguing that the EU’s open borders bring in unwanted immigrants. Hence, one assumes that populist right-wing voters opposed to European integration are drawn to the anti-immigration platforms of populist right parties, above all else. It is much less clear what kind of party cuing motivates populist left-wing voters. The “losers of globalization” hypothesis predicts that populist left voters should be more economically disadvantaged in the highly competitive single market, thereby opposing integration and voting for populist left parties based on the economic positioning of the parties. However, there is a host of unanswered questions within the “losers of globalization” theory as it relates to populist radical voters that this paper aims to explore. How do we explain the fact that some studies find that the representation gap between parties and voters is much greater for populist radical voters on both economic and immigration issues than between mainstream voters and parties? This is especially true for populist right voters. Similarly, studies show that economic voting is declining across Europe, and that individuals are more motivated by the transnationalist dimension of party politics. If this is the case, then what attracts populist left voters to Eurosceptic, left parties? In other words, when a Eurosceptic individual casts a vote for a populist radical party, what conditions their decision to swing right versus left? Grounding our work in dealignment and party cuing theories, we explore this questions through a combination of individual-level data from the European Values Study (2017) and party-level data from the latest round of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey. We analyze the nature of the representation gap between populist radical parties and voters using a multilevel modeling approach across the EU member states. We hypothesize that what sets apart populist radical right from left voters, aside from their likelihood to vote for an anti-immigration party, is the cultural dimension of party competition. Populist radical right voters are more drawn to radical right parties that endorse moral conventionalism and law and order politics. At the same time, populist radical right voters are more likely to support alternative modes of governance to democratic representation, thereby posing a threat to liberal democratic norms.